I n recent philosophies of the human, skin has been posited as the "ground of grounds, or the form of forms."
1 Open to the world, the skin is "readable"; it is that which inscribes the interior on the exterior and manifests the self. Didier Anzieu's inf luential psychoanalytical theory, for example, understands skin to function as the background or screen against which the self emerges: skin is thus "a basic datum that is of both an organic and an imaginary order, both a system for protecting our individuality and a first instrument and site of interaction with others." 2 Number fifty-four in French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy's Fifty-Eight Indices on the Body asserts: "The body, the skin: the rest is anatomical, physiological, and medical literature . . . But the truth is skin. Truth is in the skin, it makes skin: an authentic extension exposed, entirely turned outside while also enveloping the inside."
3 Coincident with the body, the truth-telling of skin, in Nancy's terms, makes it the very stuff of discourse. Likewise, Steven Connor in The Book of Skin claims: "The skin is always written: it is legendary." 4 Recent interpretations of skin as that which individuates and articulates a subject, however, often rely upon an understanding of f lesh as the skin's antithesis. Thus, f lesh, especially once skin has been stripped from it or when it appears as a lump, has been interpreted as the "form of the formless."
5 If skin is seen to coincide with body then f lesh always threatens to exceed it; when unshaped by skin, f lesh unravels form and, with it, humanness. But if we attempt to explain what it means that a lump of f lesh is the form of the formless we immediately encounter difficulties (is it then pure matter? pure form?): as Nancy points out, "we understand, strictly speaking, that it's meaningless." 6 This gets us to the heart of the problem of the mass of f lesh, since, in Nancy's taxonomy, "a mass is what is massed, gathered up in itself, penetrated with self and penetrated within itself such that, precisely, it's impenetrable. So there is nothing that articulates a mass to itself." 7 If skin is legendary, then f lesh-undifferentiated, closed in on itselfbreaks discourse down.
The skin-f lesh binary outlined in modern philosophies can also be discerned in medieval contexts, as the fourteenth-century Middle English romance The King of Tars exemplifies. Posing questions about what it means to be human, this romance has at its center a lump of f lesh born to a Christian mother and a Saracen father. This lump presents itself in the narrative as something illegible, defying interpretation. So too does the romance feature human skin: the Saracen's black skin becomes white when he converts from Islam to Christianity, having seen the lump transformed into a fully formed child after Christian baptism. Bearing out claims for its radical readability, skin in this romance "tells the truth": the authenticity of the interior change in the Saracen's belief is inscribed externally on the skin. But what the romance also discloses is that this very binary of skin and f lesh is implicated in differentiating the value of human life along physical and physiological lines: framing the romance's conversions is a series of religious wars between Christians and Muslims in which the mass slaughter of racial and cultural others is supported by these categories of difference.
In thinking about taxonomies of skin and f lesh, then, we cannot help but confront their rather disturbing history: we hardly need reminding of how skin color has been used to justify the differential treatment of humans, but the comparable role of the taxonomy of f lesh is more obscure. In this regard, perhaps most troubling is Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito's observation that, in the terms of Nazi biopolitics, "simple existence is dead life or death that lives, a f lesh without body."
